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BEYOND JUBA: DOES UGANDA NEED
A NATIONAL TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION PROCESS?
Makau Mutua*
Virtually every African state, and Uganda is not an exception, is a
product of the rape of the continent by imperial European powers.1 It is that
original sin - the illegitimate conception - that has been the bane of the
African state. It is true that Africans cannot, and should not, blame every ill
on colonialism and the nearly fatal trauma it inflicted on Africans. But any
honest intellectual excavation of the African condition cannot but locate its
pathologies in imperial conquest and its debilitating consequences. This is
not to say that the African political class has not through its unfathomable
bankruptcy done its part to sink the continent. From mighty Nigeria to pa-
thetic Chad to the comic tragedy that has become the regime of President
Mwai Kibaki in Kenya, one cannot but wonder how far Africa will fall
before it rises up again. Yet, we cannot despair. We must plant and nurture
the seeds of that renaissance that our people so desperately need and de-
serve. For beautiful Uganda, the genesis of that recovery may lie in Juba.
But it most certainly can only be realized by looking beyond Juba.
The challenges of African statehood constitute much of the litera-
ture on the post-colonial African state.2 Soon after the Decade of Indepen-
dence - the 1960s - the short burst of enthusiasm was replaced by a long,
almost unremitting, period of despair. In Uganda, military coups, civil
wars, repressive regimes, refugee flows, and economic stagnation soon
came to define the state. Uganda, like many post-colonial states, retained
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international legitimacy and its juridical status in legal, normative terms,
although there was no doubt that its empirical, domestic writ was wafer
thin.' It is remarkable the country did not collapse altogether given the
acuteness of internal illegitimacy. It is a miracle that the ravages of Milton
Obote and Idi Amin - not to mention some short-term brutes in between -
did not completely terminate the Ugandan state as we know it. Sadly, Presi-
dent Yoweri President Museveni, once hailed as a savior, has turned into a
villain, and now threatens to join the list of his disgraced and departed
predecessors.
There is no denying the obvious. Uganda has been engulfed in civil
war for most of its post-colonial existence. After the 1986 Museveni take-
over of the state - a regime change that was hailed across the globe - there
was an undeniable opportunity for the political class to cultivate a new con-
sensus and a social contract between the state and the people. At first, Presi-
dent Museveni appeared to listen. The elites and the intelligentsia
welcomed him as he restored law and order and embarked on a project of
state reconstruction. Even a truth commission, known as the Commission of
Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights, was established to uncover the
truth and chart a path to national healing.4 But its mandate was too vacuous,
legalistic, and narrow. Besides, it lacked the political will, resources, and
imagination to make a break with the past. It was virtually irrelevant by the
time it produced its voluminous report in 1994. In any case, President
Museveni, once considered an idealist, had been corrupted by power. By all
accounts, he had lost the zest to reform the state and reconstitute its power.
In 1995, President Museveni instituted an illiberal constitution under which
his exotic "Movement System" banned political competition and assured
his continuation in power. But in 2005, he bowed to domestic and interna-
tional pressure to permit open political activity and multipartyism, although
he retained all levers on power. In the face of stiff opposition, he amended
the constitution to remove term limits so that he could be returned to power,
which he was in March 2006.
The point is that beyond the first few years of his rule when he
feigned reform, President Museveni soon became a typical post-colonial
despot. Even in this, he was out of touch with the rest of Africa, most of
whose leaders had acquiesced to some form of political competition. As a
result, today he sticks out like a sore thumb in a continent once dotted by
one-party states and Strong Men. The result of the political dictatorship that
3 Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist. 35
WORLD POLITICS 1, 5 (1982).
4 Recommendations by the Uganda Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of
Human Rights, 3 EAST AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 140 (1997).
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President Museveni has established is a country that has failed to cohere
into a nation. In the north, a civil war that is now more than two decades old
continues to ravage the people. The key protagonists in the war - the bar-
baric Lord's Resistance Army and the Uganda People's Defense Force -
have pursued a scotched earth policy although it is clear that there cannot be
a military solution to the conflict. In the aftermath, tens of thousands have
been slaughtered and maimed, and millions displaced. The enormity of the
atrocities committed in that conflict haunt the human conscience. Elsewhere
in Uganda, over twenty civil wars and conflicts have raged in the past two
decades alone.
Two decades into his reign - for that is what it is - there is little
doubt that the Museveni state lacks the basic political legitimacy and will to
create a united, viable, and democratic state. It is more than clear, given the
multiple challenges to his regime over the years, that he does not command
the loyalties of vast segments of the population. Under these circumstances,
what is to be done? I believe that Uganda will not recover as a state if it
does not confront the demons that have tormented it for decades. First,
Uganda must have the courage to objectively and without fear or favor
identify those demons. But the process for the identification of those de-
mons must be national, inclusive, transformational, and cathartic. Secondly,
although the Museveni government must facilitate this process, it cannot
own or control it. An independent and truly representative body of all stake-
holders must be empanelled to define and lead the process of national re-
covery. Thirdly, the process of unveiling the pathologies that have crippled
society must be open and participatory. It must include especially those
who have been aggrieved, no matter the nature, seriousness, or severity of
their grievances.
The history of Uganda has been brutal, and the perpetrators of
human rights atrocities may be as many as their victims. That is why for a
truly national truth and reconciliation process, no one can be left out. But
this process will not succeed unless it results in some measure of justice -
even retributive justice. In this regard, the Uganda Amnesty Commission
and the law under which it is established must be scrutinized afresh to de-
termine if they can be a useful and organic part of the process of national
recovery. Blanket amnesties or isolated and incoherent peace accords with
disparate factions and rebel groups will do nothing to transform the ship of
state unless they are part and parcel of a comprehensive national truth and
reconciliation process.
REFORM AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
The political convulsions of the 1990s irrevocably altered the politi-
cal cultures of most African states. The protest coalitions of oppositionists,
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professionals, students, the press, and trade unions left an indelible mark on
the African state. They forced long-serving autocrats to either relinquish
power through open elections, overthrew them outright, or loosened the
grip of the state over society through piece-meal reforms. Virtually no state
was left untouched by the wave of change dubbed by many Africans the
second liberation, suggesting an epochal shift of the magnitude of
decolonization. Crawford Young identifies Libya and Sudan as the only
holdouts, but even the latter acquiesced to "token gestures of liberaliza-
tion." 5 With a few exceptions, gone were the big men who bestrode the
African state like a colossus. President Museveni's clever arguments in
favor of the Movement System and no-party democracy seemed to defy
these pressures. The West, of whom he became a darling, shielded him
from domestic challenges to open up the political system. It is this collusion
between the West and his regime that retarded the recovery of the state.
Admittedly, many of these reformist changes in Africa have yielded
mixed results, and one needs only look at next door in Kenya to see why.
Even so, many of these political transformations have ushered the project of
democratization, not matter how uneven and wobbly. At the core of these
reforms is one thing: the struggle over the nature of the state. At the center
of that question is how state power is organized, shared, and exercised. In
other words, the constitution of the state - the sum total of its powers - lies
at the center of the crises of the modern African state. That is why the most
urgent question for reformers should revolve around the constitution as a
document of values, objectives, and principles. Clearly, rewriting the con-
stitution by itself will not suffice to cure the African malaise. But it is the
essential starting point for political transformation and the reclamation of
the state. For without a redefinition of the meaning and the purpose of the
state - and its relationship to individuals and groups in society - the politi-
cal culture cannot be transformed for the better. But the constitution is just
one of the many variables that the reconfiguration of state power in Africa
must address. The nature and origin of the African state - and its relation-
ship with the international legal, political, and economic orders - must be
part of the package of reforms to bring the continent out of its abyss.
The focus of this speech is the struggle to reform the Ugandan state
through a new compact born of a national truth and reconciliation process.
That process, which must involve at some level the work of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Juba talks, must be holistic. But Uganda, like
other African states, suffers from a script of normative and structural defi-
cits that ostensibly defy fundamental reforms. These weaknesses of the Af-
I Crawford Young, The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities
and Contradictions, in STATE, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, 15.
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rican state are largely responsible for the failure of the democratic project.
The question is whether Uganda can recognize these common vault lines
and heal them in a way that responds to the needs of its population. In other
words, what overarching themes or questions must be addressed in the re-
form of the African state, and Uganda, in particular? How can these themes
be applied to tackle the problem of the viability of the Ugandan state? In the
sections below, I identify and discuss those variables.
The crisis of the Ugandan state is an inability to create a viable,
legitimate, and democratic society. Virtually every major thinker and politi-
cal scientist concerned with Africa has identified this problem as the bane
of the African state. Simply put, the Ugandan state suffers from a deficit of
democracy. But this begs the question - why is there a deficit of democ-
racy? Political democracy, as a normative and structural ideology, arises
from liberalism. Liberalism, in turn, is distinguished from other traditions
by its commitment to formal autonomy and abstract equality. In its contem-
porary expression, liberalism requires a constitutional state with limited
powers. Such a state would be anchored in a political democracy under the
genus of a system known as constitutionalism. Today, many of these values
have been captured in the human rights corpus, a collection of norms and
practices that bind the state to limited, prescribed conduct.
6
One of the roots of liberal theory has been its attention to the risk of
the abuse of the individual by the state. Hence the skepticism of liberal
theorists about entrusting the state with power that is not subject to enforce-
able limitations. Translated into political terms, constitutionalism then re-
quires a system of government with several incontestable features, albeit in
varying configurations. The state must be based on a conception of popular
sovereignty in which the constitution assures that the state is accountable to
the people through a range of devices and techniques, the most critical of
which is open, periodic, multiparty elections.7 But the powers of the state
would be curtailed through the system of checks and balances and the sepa-
ration of the three arms of the state to ensure an independent judiciary. In
this scheme, the judiciary is the guardian of legality and of the rule of law
to safeguard individual rights through the judicial review of executive ac-
tion. Otherwise, the executive or the legislature could run amok and impose
tyrannical rule on the populace. But constitutionalism is not just a set of
rules, procedures, devices, and techniques. To become meaningful, consti-
tutionalism must empirically become a set of cultural norms and values
subscribed to by officialdom and the public at large at their core. It must be
6 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
7 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 990 (2000).
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part of their zeitgeist. Uganda lacks almost all these basic rudiments for
democracy.
In emergent societies, as is the case in Uganda, democracy cannot
be merely a matter of procedures and rules. Democratic rule must be
viewed as substantive, meaning that procedures and rules must have just
and legitimate outcomes in the eyes of the populace. That is why the 2006
presidential elections in Uganda failed this test. In such a case, the experi-
ment in open government will fail. That is why Schumpeter 8 and Hunting-
ton, 9 whose definitions of democracy are predominantly procedural, may
not completely speak for the African condition. For Africa, democracy can-
not simply be a method; it must pay particular attention to outcomes. Other-
wise, the state will not incubate in the people allegiance to it. Furthermore,
outsider groups and interests will foreswear the state and deny it legitimacy.
Although as Dahl suggests open elections are the critical difference in a
democracy, the formal right to vote and stand for elections can be meaning-
less as an abstract rule if substantive conditions do not exist to permit real
choices and minimize barriers to participation. 10 Even though democracy is
the single most important deficit in Uganda - and the critical proxy for the
legitimization of the state - it would be a mistake to treat it simply as a
method of governance.
Scholars have therefore put forward several thematic categories that
should be addressed in the recovery of the African state. There is neither
unanimity on the number of categories nor on the emphasis to be placed on
each. What is not in doubt, however, is the salience of each of the catego-
ries. Needless to say, the categories revolve around the viability and legiti-
macy of the state. One of the most important, and perhaps the only category
on which there is universal agreement among the scholars of African polit-
ics, is democratization. Democratization is a recurrent theme in the work of
every scholar on African politics." The subject appears in variety of guises
8 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1950).
9 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 6 (1991).
10 R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 14, 71 (1956).
11 See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES, FACING
CHALLENGES (J. Oloka-Onyango, ed., 2001); WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-
MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA,
1992-1997 (1999); ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA (Jennifer Widner, ed., 1994); DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE HARD
ROAD AHEAD (Marina Ottaway, ed., 1997); RICHARD JOSEPH, THE DEMOCRATIC
CHALLENGE IN AFRICA (1995); DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA
(Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, & 0. Oyediran, eds., 1988); BEYOND CAPITAL-
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- as governance, electoral politics, and political participation, among
others. Richard Joseph refers to this phenomenon as the reconstitution of
political order. 12 Indeed, this is an exercise that requires a fundamental re-
construction of the state beyond the traditional panacea of multiparty elec-
tions, strengthening legislatures, or revitalizing political parties. But the
state cannot be reconstructed without a new constitutional dispensation.
That is why a new democratic constitution - one that is popularly mandated
- must be written. In this regard, Uganda must go back to the drawing
board and rework its constitutional dispensation to endow it with popular
legitimacy.
The other key theme involves the centrality of civil society in the
reconstruction and democratization of the Ugandan state. It is not the pur-
pose here to explore in any depth the conceptual meanings and definitions
of civil society from John Locke or Georg Hegel and their theory of the
social contract.13 Patrick Chabal has defined civil society as a "vast ensem-
ble of constantly changing groups and individuals whose only common
ground is their being outside the state and who have. . acquired some
consciousness of their externality and opposition to the state. ' 14 As Young
correctly notes, given this definition, civil societies pre-dated the imposition
of the colonial state by Europeans. 5 In any case, the modern state, includ-
ing its post-colonial variant, is deemed incapable of self-restraint without a
vigilant and vibrant civil society. 16 Thus civil society is an indispensable
element in the push for democratization. An analysis of any political transi-
ISM AND SOCIALISM IN KENYA AND TANZANIA (Joel D. Barkan, ed., 1994);
MICHAEL BRATTON & NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN
AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); CLAUDE
AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (1996); Claude Ake, Rethinking
African Democracy, 2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 32 (1991).
12 JOSEPH, STATE, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, supra note 2, at 3.
13 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Aldine Press 1955)
(1960); THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: STUDIES IN HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSO-
PHY (Z.A. Pelczynski ed., 1984); CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES (John Keane ed , 1988).
14 PATRICK CHABAL, Introduction, in POLITICAL DOMINATION IN AFRICA 15
(1986).
15 CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE 222 (1994).
16 CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN AFRICA (John W. Harbeson, Donald
Rothchild, & Naomi Chazan, eds., 1994); MICHAEL BRATTON & NICHOLAS VAN DE
WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA, supra note 11, at 147-149.
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tion must of necessity pay particular attention to the structure, role, compo-
sition, size and depth, and philosophy that drive civil society.
A critically important variable in the reformation of the Ugandan
state is the relationship between state power and ethnic groups that consti-
tute the whole. The failure, and tragic collapse, of a number of Ugandan
regimes has been occasioned by their inability to accommodate pre-colonial
group identities and forge a common national psyche and destiny. The col-
lapse of the regimes of Obote I and II was largely attributable to the failure
of the state to devise a system of government that could adequately provide
for the fruitful co-existence of its contending nationalities. In legal constitu-
tional terms, this is deceptively a problem of balancing group rights with
the interests of the central state. Yet the calculus is more complex. It is
more about forging a national character by absorbing pre-colonial identities
into the whole without establishing an informal hierarchy of ethnicities. To
be sure, this may include systems of devolution at the local level, but within
a unifying, accommodating, and inclusive central authority.
Political parties occupy a central place in the governance of the
modem state. But in Uganda, this has not been the case ever since the
regime of Idi Amin. Political parties have been suppressed although their
consciousness could never be eradicated. President Museveni largely muted
the wave of political liberalization that swept through Africa in the 1990s,
although the embers of multipartyism remained very much alive. But
Ugandan political parties have not per se been a force for democratization.
Ugandan political parties are not generally guided by ideological considera-
tions and rarely, if at all, mobilize their members on the basis of coherent
policies. Regrettably, parties in Uganda and other parts of Africa are either
empty receptacles for ethnic barons or have no deep resonance in the popu-
lation. As a result, the ability of political parties to deepen and incubate
democratic discourse is sharply limited. Even so, the project of democracy
requires competent and ideologically sound political parties. That is why
this is not an argument against political parties. Nor should a single godfa-
ther exclude Ugandan political parties from the politics by virtue of this
argument. The state simply has to create a constitutional and legislative
framework to govern political parties so that they can be driven by ideol-
ogy, become internally democratic, mainstream gender, and assume a na-
tional identity. The maturation of political parties is a continuous process,
not an event.
Last, but not least, is the tendency of messianic religions - Islam
and Christianity - to either be a flashpoint of conflict or retard political
discourse because of strict and textualist interpretations of religious doc-
trines and texts. In several cases, religious and sectarian conflict has been a
source of instability and dysfunction in the state. Among other factors, re-
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ligious conflicts and intolerance have been responsible for the inability of
the state to become viable and democratic. They have made it extremely
difficult to tame political power and have wrecked havoc with institution
building. Even when not engaged in conflict with others, Islam and Christi-
anity have tended to advocate public positions that either undermine or re-
strict the rights of women and girls. Again, in the case of Uganda, this has
been largely with respect to "hot-button" social questions, such as gender
equality, family law, property ownership and inheritance, and privacy in the
law and constitution making processes.17 The potential for the use of relig-
ion to entrench the subordination of women - and hence the retardation of
the democratic project - in the patriarchal Ugandan state cannot be
overstated.
UNPACKING THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS
But the reformist project that I sketch for Uganda in this speech will
not happen without deliberate orchestration. That is why the Juba talks offer
a unique moment to nationalize a truth, peace, justice, and reconciliation
process. Truth and national reconciliation processes are relatively new insti-
tutional vehicles in the universe of law and justice. As an institution of
transitional justice, such processes are just over two decades old.' 8 The
centerpiece of such a process has usually been a truth commission. Each
country where it has been established - starting in Argentina and later in
Uganda, South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Ghana, Sierra
Leone, among others - has had to improvise and craft an institution that
was determined by the particular country's traumatic history and the bal-
ance of the political forces. That is why there is no model truth commission
or peace process anywhere that Uganda can simply mimic or copy. But
Uganda, having had a truth commission already, needs to look beyond such
an institution and think about a holistic approach to peace and reconcilia-
tion. In any case, even if a truth commission were to be established, it
would have to go beyond the narrow confines of the Uganda Commission
of Inquiry into the Violations of Human Rights. Even so, Uganda should
learn from the experiences of other countries, and decide the type of peace
and reconciliation process it should explore. It is my view that Uganda
should address its past and present crises with the institution of a truth and
reconciliation process that is guided by a truth commission, but with a wide
17 SYLVIA TAMALE, WHEN HENS BEGIN TO CROW: GENDER AND PARLIAMENTARY
POLITICS IN UGANDA (1999).
18 Martha Minow, The Work of Re-Membering: After Genocide and Mass Atroc-
ity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 429 (1999); PRISCILLA B. HEYNER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 10 (2001).
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mandate to reconstruct the state. This must include addressing the variables
of reconstituting political order, rewriting the constitution, and developing a
national framework in which civil society and political parties can become
the central engines of democratization. It is in this context that the
ethnicization of politics and the use of religion to retard democracy can be
addressed. That is the only route by which current abominations, such the
genocidal conflict waged by both the LRA and the government in the north,
can be permanently terminated.
The truth commission is now an internationally familiar conception
and institution for a state emerging from a period of gross human rights
abuses and abominable economic crimes and debating how to address them.
The term truth commission serves as the generic designation of a type of
national organ and process that is intended to construct a record of this
tragic and barbaric history. Thus truth commissions offer countries ways of
responding to years of bare-knuckled barbarism run rampant, of horrific
human rights violations that took place for political, ethnic, religious, tribal,
economic, class, ideological, gender, and other conflicts over justice,
power, and the control of economic resources. Truth commissions may be
an alternative to other national responses to these abuses and societal dys-
functions. At the one extreme, these responses could include criminal pros-
ecutions. On the other, the granting of some form of amnesty to the
perpetrators. Truth commissions are established for gross human rights vio-
lations that normal adjudicatory process cannot, are unwilling, or unable, to
address.19
Truth commissions are created principally at the time of a state's
transition toward a more democratic or participatory government, a govern-
ment that espouses the ideals of democracy, of power bounded by law, of
formal legal equality, and social justice. It matters not how the moment of
political change occurred - it could have been violent or non-violent. What
matters is that there is a normative and substantive departure by the govern-
ment or state from its predecessor or previous policies and attitudes. Thus it
could be change from autocracy to democracy, from opacity to trans-
parency, from open shameless graft to fiscal and economic accountability.
But that change must be structural, ideological, and fundamental, it cannot
be a continuation of the same. The change must signal real and genuine
regime transformation. The question for Uganda is whether that moment of
transition is at hand. Does the Museveni state seek and understand the ne-
cessity of a lasting solution to the problems of legitimacy that have bedev-
iled it since 1986? Is the state willing to enter a new compact no just with
19 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth,
Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (2003).
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the north or the LRA, but with all its citizens? In a word, is the state ready
to embrace genuine democracy?
National truth and reconciliation processes can serve multiple
objectives, which are all interrelated. They can act as a sort of a national
catharsis in which the country goes through a deep and penetrating process
of cleansing the past.2 0 This function is akin to therapy. It can perform the
function of moral reconstruction, in which a country takes stock of its mo-
rality in politics, governance, cultural values, and its view of humanity.
Moral reconstruction implies learning lessons from the past and revising the
nation's moral code. It could be a vehicle for reconciliation after truth and
justice have been told and done. Here, society must pass judgment on what
it has heard; it must, in effect, establish a moral account of the historical
record. This process of introspection is deeply political, although it is also
moral. It is political because it requires the nation - both victim and perpe-
trator alike - to know, understand, and acknowledge the moral wrongs that
were committed, and why. Without this basic acknowledgement, there can
be no genuine movement to a cleaner and more just future. The nation must,
as it were, submit itself to the moral truth about its past, no matter how
abominable.
Another function, which is probably the most important one, is that
of truth telling, where the perpetrators bare all, and the victims recount the
horrors visited upon them by the sadism of either the state or non-state
actors. In Uganda, there is no doubt that the state has done its share of
abominations. But non-state actors, including the Museveni rebel forces
when they were fighting to capture the state, have been equally brutal and
barbaric. Take for example, the unspeakable evils committed by Joseph
Kony's so-called Lord's Resistance Army. Its brutalities are so shocking
that just reading accounts of them is simply sickening.21 The most vulnera-
ble victims have been women and girls, who have been subjected to in-
describable crimes. Justice at the international level is so rare in such
atrocities that credible domestic processes are indispensable.2 2 Domestic
truth and reconciliation processes might yield several options: a society
may choose to forget or ignore the truth, gloss over it, or use it to sanction
the perpetrators and deploy it for the moral and political reconstruction of
the state. Some truth commission processes seek the truth, others justice or
reconciliation, and some all three. Most truth commissions are victim-cen-
20 See DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (2000).
21 See Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al.
22 See Betty Murungi, Prosecuting Gender Crimes at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, AFR. LEGAL AID Q (April-June 2001).
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tered. In Uganda, the process must combine truth telling with justice and
national reconciliation.
In terms of the implementation of the national truth and reconcilia-
tion process, whose focal point is usually a truth commission, there must
inclusivity and open participation. In this respect, the proceedings must be
carried live on radio and television countrywide. The commission must
have the power to summon and subpoena and require any person to appear
before it and completely submit to its instructions or be held in contempt
and jailed. It must facilitate, and where necessary initiate or coordinate in-
quiries into: gross violations of human rights and economic crimes (perhaps
these should be separate), including violations which were part of a system-
atic nature; the nature, causes, and extent of gross violations of human
rights and economic crimes, including the antecedents, circumstances, fac-
tors, context, motives and perspectives that led to the violations; the identity
of all persons, authorities, institutions, and organizations involved in such
violations; and establish whether the violations were the result of deliberate
planning on the part of the state or any of its organs, or any political organi-
zation, official, or individual. No perpetrators - be they non-state actors or
government officials - can be shielded from the open process. Nor should
any blanket amnesties be given to buy peace. That is a recipe for the contin-
uation of impunity. The Uganda amnesty law violates a cardinal principle
of the struggle against impunity. 23 That is why the indictment of the LRA
Five by the ICC cannot be vacated for the sake of appeasing a monster. It
would buy a false peace and render the whole process of transitional justice
meaningless.
Truth and reconciliation processes must have justice as their core
function. They must establish accountability, both political, moral, and legal
for the violations; facilitate, initiate, gather, and coordinate the collection of
information and evidence from any person, including victims, which estab-
lishes the identity of the victims of such violations, and their perpetrators;
establish the fate and status of victims, and the extent of harm, suffering, or
loss incurred by them; determine what compensation, reparations, and resti-
tution should be awarded to victims, their families, and survivors; order the
dismissal and barring from public service or politics of particular perpetra-
tors; order the seizure, forfeiture, and surrender of illegally acquired prop-
erty and other material goods, including money and other fiscal
instruments; and make mandatory referrals to the responsible institutions
created to sanction and prosecute those who are deemed eligible for punish-
ment. The final report of the process must be made public in full. It must
23 See Human Rights Watch, Uganda: No Amnesty for Atrocities, July 28, 2006,
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/27/ugandal3863.htm.
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decide if a limited number of amnesties with qualified immunity ought to
be granted to further the ends of national reconciliation. The process should
not last for more than two years because it would sap national energy and
be the subject of sabotage by detractors and perpetrators.
There are two possible routes for the establishment of a national
truth and reconciliation process. Its central organ, such as a truth commis-
sion, could to be established either as an independent organ by an act of
parliament or through a presidential order under the powers granted him by
the Constitution. In either case, the truth commission must not be subject to
direction or dictation from any official or arm of government. For obvious
reasons, the legitimacy and independence of the process must be beyond
reproach. All the members who direct and conduct the process must be
chosen for their probity, expertise, and outstanding morality. Effective truth
commissions are not large. They must be drawn from among the widest
cross-section of Ugandans. The commission should include several non-
nationals known for their competence, fairness, and expertise. This would
act to check the partiality of nationals and bring in comparative exper-
iences. It may also inspire confidence in non-state actors who may feel that
justice is not possible from a purely national panel.
CONNECTING JUBA TO NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
In this speech, I have attempted to advocate something broader and
more encompassing than a simple truth commission, although I believe that
such an institution ought to be an important part of the project of national
recovery for Uganda. I do not believe that the Uganda Commission of In-
quiry into the Violation of Human Rights served its purpose. But in the
context of the contemporary situation, I believe that it would be foolhardy
to think about instituting a garden-variety truth commission. The reason is
that Uganda is beset by two separate, but interrelated, challenges. Both have
their bases in the illegitimacy of the Museveni regime. The first comes from
elements within civil society and the political parties who believe that the
state is undemocratic and illiberal. These sectors, which seek a democratic
renewal of the state through constitutional means, believe that President
Museveni is a major stumbling block to democratization. The second chal-
lenge is posed by armed non-state actors, the most prominent of which the
LRA, which is irredentist in nature, although its exact political project re-
mains a mystery. Both challenges raise questions of self-determination.
The good news is that the Juba talks provide an opening through which a
process to comprehensively address both problems could be launched.
However, it is not lost on anyone that national reconstruction and
reconciliation are not possible without truth and justice. It is also clear that
a reconciliation process - with Kony's LRA in particular - must not be
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achieved by forgiving the perpetrators and forgetting the victims.2 4 Such an
expedient, unprincipled outcome would simply entrench impunity and
strengthen the imperial and undemocratic state that President Museveni has
constructed over the last two decades. There is little doubt that an isolated
pact with the LRA would make President Museveni even more contemptu-
ous of the democratic reformers who seek change by civil means and
processes. That is why every attempt must be made to link Juba to a com-
prehensive reform of the state. The institution that would spearhead the re-
form and peace process - a truth commission with a broad mandate -
cannot be a witch-hunt or a whitewash. It cannot be selective or target any
particular community.
Those who do not learn from the mistakes of history are bound to
repeat them. A true democratic transition cannot simply overlook, blink at,
or gloss over the gross human rights violations and economic crimes com-
mitted by state and non-state actors since Uganda's independence in 1962.
It is only by fully confronting the past - and completely accounting for it -
can Ugandans create a legitimate basis for democratic development and ec-
onomic renewal. Ugandans cannot simply forgive and forget the abomina-
ble crimes of the past. Nor should the victims of past abuses be expected to
contemplate forgiveness without a full public accounting and unless justice
has been done. But no one must forget because national amnesia for past
abuses invites their recurrence. The pathologies of the Ugandan state, which
now traumatize its people, cannot be swept under carpet. Only a broad,
inclusive, and open national conversation can start the healing process.
Ultimately, the reform of the Ugandan state lies in the full-fledged
democratization of political society. In this, civil society and political par-
ties must play the leading role. President Museveni must understand that he
will not live forever, and should therefore not conflate the fate of the
Ugandan people and state with his personal political fortunes and future.
Uganda is - and must be - greater than any single individual. That is the
premise of modern statehood. That is why President Museveni must allow a
national process of reconstruction to commence at once. He must not at-
tempt to control or manipulate that process to his narrow political and parti-
san interests. After rescuing Uganda from the Amin and Obote death choke,
President Museveni should now be concerned about the legacy that he will
leave the country. Does he want to plunge it back into the abyss of yester-
year, or would he rather oversee the full democratization of the country?
Whether he seizes the Juba talks as an opportunity to overhaul the state will
determine his legacy.
21 Jeffrey Gettleman, UNEnvoy Meets with Ugandan Rebel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2006, at A3.
